Xi Jinping, China’s current supreme leader, is often vilified as being responsible for China’s recent authoritarian backsliding. By contrast, his predecessor, Hu Jintao, is given undue credit for attempting to make China a more ‘Singapore-style paternalistic state’. During his presidency, Hu made significant attempts to undermine Deng Xiaoping’s laissez-faire economic policy and replace it with a more dirigiste, autocratic one, most clearly evidenced by the extent of state-owned enterprise (SOE) domination of the economy under his rule. Hu also implemented a number of authoritarian social policies, such as his restrictions on civil liberties and glorification of the Chinese leadership. Finally, Hu made several attempts to centralise power within the Politburo, albeit not to the same extent as Xi.
Authoritarian backsliding under Hu was most evident in his economic policy, though many experts maintain that Hu used socialist rhetoric to promote Deng’s capitalism. Not only was privatisation terminated, but the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) heavily subsidised ‘national champions (SOEs)’ which he hoped could compete with foreign companies and favoured them in regulatory measures. Although several pro-Hu academics observe that the share of SOEs in Chinese business dropped to 5%, this is a largely irrelevant measure to assess their control, as their combined output remained at 26% regardless. Hu’s attitude was partly a response to rising public support for Lang Xianping, a Hong Kong professor who denounced Chinese free markets by pointing to the draining of state-owned assets. The support for Lang can be attributed to widening economic inequalities in China under Deng and Jiang, which many people blamed on their policy that ‘some people [should] get rich first’.
Hu is best known for calling for intra-party democracy, which has fuelled the misconception regarding his benevolence. Ironically, these campaigns resulted in the rise of the neo-Marxist faction, which called for greater social and economic authoritarianism. Of course, civil liberties had been brutally suppressed before either Hu or Xi came to power; for example, Deng had called for censorship since the early 1980s, and Jiang began construction of the ‘Great Firewall’ in 1998, limiting Chinese internet access by blocking a number of foreign websites.
Despite this, Deng and Jiang had developed a form of ‘resilient authoritarianism’ by allowing the promotion of civilian grievances through village elections, civil society activity, and legal adjudication, and created appropriate policies in response. This led to more calls for free speech and more accountability for local officials, which prompted Hu to reverse their changes since he feared that the people would eventually ask for concessions that would undermine the CCP’s supremacy. In addition, the democratic revolutions of the 2000s in central Asia and the Middle East made Hu believe that the Chinese public would attempt something similar, particularly fearing a repeat of the Tunisian Jasmine Revolution that took place from December 2010 to January 2011. Hence, he authorised a set of sweeping autocratic reforms, from improving internal security apparatus to changing court procedures.
Hu’s autocratic attitude is also evidenced by his media control, most notably in the period after the 2008 Beijing Olympics, which was characterised by intensive censorship of human rights issues and criticisms of the CCP. This was further exposed in 2008 when he faced much criticism for his response to Tibetan unrest, the Sichuan earthquake, and the Melamine Milk Scandal. Hu later issued new restrictions on journalism and punished those who violated them. He also launched a campaign in 2007 to ‘purify the internet’, which led to the formation of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology a year later, which is still responsible for online censorship today. His use of propaganda and ideological education was more extensive than Jiang’s as well, and it encompassed initiatives such as the “Eight Honours and Eight Shames” and the “Core Socialist Values”. Moreover, Jiang began, and Hu widened the implementation of the ‘social credit system’, which rewards pro-Party behaviour with financial gain, whereas many Sinologists (scholars of China and Chinese society) wrongly label this as Xi’s initiative.
Such social authoritarianism is also reflected in the cults of personality that these leaders build. While Xi has filled up his party with loyalists, Hu’s stance should also not have warranted the optimism it did, whereby many contemporary experts believed that China would democratise, just as South Korea or Taiwan had. This is because instances of personalistic rule had occurred under Hu’s leadership; for example, 4% of Hu’s speeches during his tenure highlighted his ideology, “Scientific Outlook on Development”, whereas only 1% of Jiang’s speeches mentioned his “Three Represents”. Personalistic rule is also complemented by a plea to China’s citizens to embrace ‘struggle’, which is often correlated with authoritarianism since the CCP regularly uses societal issues as excuses to consolidate its power, and these calls increased under Hu to Maoist levels for the first time. When Wen Jiabao, Hu’s premier, argued that an independent judicial system and allowing anti-government criticism would ensure that power “truly belongs to the people”, only 23 party elders supported him, and Hu quickly censored these ideas. Additionally, while Hu had not controlled the Party with the same authority as his predecessors, he formalised party interference in the People’s Liberation Army for the first time, allowing party members to override commander-issued orders regarding military affairs.
Although Hu may have retired from Chinese politics, his legacy should not be smiled upon as much as it is today. His radical economic, social, and intra-party changes have demonstrated that hopes of China’s democratisation should likely have died earlier than they did.
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