“Wir sind dem Untergang geweiht!” (We are doomed!)
These were the words of General Paulus, commander of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad, after the complete encirclement of his forces by the Red Army on 23 November 1942. This was a major change of fortune; just two weeks before, Goebbels boasted that the Germans had taken “90% of the city” pushing General Chuikov’s Russian 62nd Army within metres of the Volga. For the Germans victory was within sight. However, General Zhukov and Vasilevsky thought otherwise. They created a plan for the “encirclement and isolation of the main concentration of German troops within Stalingrad”, a task labelled ‘Operation Uranus.’ Just four days after the initiation of the operation, the encirclement of Paulus’s army was complete.
The weakness of Hitler’s allied Romanian Third and Fourth Armies proved pivotal in the success of Operation Uranus. General Paulus himself said on 18 November “The Romanian defence of our flanks will dictate the future of the Sixth Army”. Events proved the validity of this assessment. The Romanian Third and Fourth Armies, respectively placed on the Northern and Southern flanks of the Sixth Army, protected Paulus’s army from encirclement. When the Romanian defence collapsed the success of Operation Uranus was inevitable. Werner Haupt argues that the operation’s success lay in the “fault of a fundamentally weak and demoralised Romanian Army”. The Romanian army consisted of 250,000 men, of which half were conscripts of whom 2,000 were civilian convicts sentenced for rape, looting and murder. The Romanians were also poorly paid, receiving just sixty lei per month, only enough to buy a litre of milk, and their rations only amounted to half a mess tin of hot food per day. Morale was so low that Romanian officers forbade soldiers to write home in case it led to severe unrest back in Bucharest. The lack of morale and extreme unwillingness to fight for a leader, Marshal Antonescu, who they saw as having“sold their Motherland to Germany”, meant the Romanians as Haupt argues “fled whenever possible”.
On 19 November, the Red Army’s initial artillery barrage on Romanian positions left their defences destroyed, with Romanian soldiers allegedly surrendering in droves. According to Petr Zhulyev, a Russian soldier of the 21st Army, “They were a laughable sight”. Zhulyev’s analysis is supported by a German perspective offered by General Heim of the 48th Panzer Division, who wrote, “The only Romanians I can see are fleeing infantrymen…they are running away from the war and want only to save their lives”. Heim was certainly not wrong in his analysis. Belov’s 50th Infantry Division managed to tear through the Romanian 5th Infantry Division, while the Romanian 14th Infantry Division was overwhelmed by the Russian 119th and 47th Rifle Divisions, causing many to flee. However, the German troops in the line, unaware that Romanian losses were far higher than their own, came to believe that all Romanians had simply fled and thus treated them with increasing contempt.
Another German first-hand report of Romanian weaknesses had a similar tone of contempt. Hans Ulrich Ruder, a Stuka pilot, wrote: “There are masses in brown retreating. Are they Russians? No Romanians! … We find all the Romanian positions deserted”. The surrender of some 55,000 Romanians would seem to confirm these judgements. However, not only had Romanian Third Army forces fought bravely, but considering that visibility so was bad, owing to dense blizzards and fog, it is unlikely that Ulrich was able to see 13,000 feet below him. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that the Romanians were far from “a laughable sight”. A German liaison officer within the Romanian 13th Infantry Division reported that the first Russian assault had been repulsed and that they had managed to halt Kozin’s 63rd Rifle Division. It was far from a lack of morale or equipment that caused the fallback of the Romanians, but rather the Russians’ mastery of both. The opening bombardment consisted of over 3,500 artillery guns and was so powerful that the 22nd Panzer Division stationed 30 miles from the front line was woken by small earthquake-like trembles from the artillery.
Ziemke’s view that the Romanians lacked “reaction” is also demonstrably false. The Romanians had reacted long before the start of Uranus on 19 November. A German liaison officer reported on 7 November that the Third Romanian Army was expecting a strong enemy attack with tanks in the Kletskaya Raspopinskaya sector. Romania’s Defence Minister Mihai Antonescu, pressed Germany’s Ambassador Manfred Freiherr von Killinger for more supplies and equipment since he foresaw the large-scale mobilisation of Russian forces at the border. However, Hitler and his General staff dismissed Romanian claims of a build-up of Russian manpower on either flank, thus rejecting any calls for reinforcements.
Despite being heavily outnumbered, and lacking morale and modern equipment, the Romanians still fought bravely. By 11:00 am on the 19th, the Russians had only advanced three kilometres, far from the fifteen kilometres that they had hoped for. Moreover, once the Russian offensive had penetrated the Romanian defences, they remained steadfast and carried on fighting. After Kravchenko’s breakthrough, Sion’s 15th Rifle Division halted a breakout attempt Westwards, destroying eight out of fifteen Soviet tanks. Even despite the encirclement of the Lascar Group, they continued fighting, surviving until 24 November, when the Red Army strengthened its outer encirclement and finally crushed the Romanian forces.
Undoubtedly, in the face of superior Russian forces, the Romanians fought bravely, but as the waves of Soviet attack increased, they had no chance of resisting for long. The Russian amassment and German neglect had meant that on the Southwestern Front alone, the Romanian Third Army was outnumbered three to one by the Russian infantry (100,000 to 331,000) and seven to one in terms of tank power (100 to 721). Their unbending will to survive was perhaps best displayed by General Lascar’s refusal to surrender on 22 November, conveying the extent to which the Romanians fought on in the face of impending defeat.
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