From his ascendency to the Zulu throne in 1816 to his assassination in 1828, the warrior-king Shaka Zulu transformed the tribe into an empire so mighty that it ruled over all of Natal, hence the region’s modern name, and so dominant that it survived until 1879, only falling at the hands of the British in the Anglo-Zulu War.
For approximately 300 years prior to Shaka’s grand rise, southern Africa, in particular Natal, was in a political state of fracture; hundreds of small tribes were living in their own regions of the expansive plateaus. Rivalry between the sons of tribal leaders would often lead to the tribe splitting, and economies were primarily based on shifting cultivation and cattle raising, leading to substantial dispersion owing to tribes constantly needing to seek new or better land. Eventually, an increase in population across Natal and the dwindling of unoccupied land created a situation in which fission and movement could no longer solve dynastic disputes or economic problems.
Beginning in the middle of the eighteenth century, a slow political revolution occurred, manifesting itself in the increase in the size of African polities. African rulers with privileged access to the profits of trade could distribute goods, thus expanding their networks of patronage, and, equally, they could provide security to smaller tribes. Naturally, concentrations of power arose, and two groups emerged in Natal by the 1800s as overlords over weaker neighbouring clans: the Ndwandwe clan of Chief Zwide KaLanga in the northwest and the Mthethwa clan of Chief Dingiswayo Kajobe in the southeast.
Dingiswayo had been able to achieve military success simply by organizing regiments by the age of his men. Without altering weapons or tactics, but simply by increasing organizational efficiency, he was able from 1806 to 1809 to conquer over 30 tribes and establish for himself a chiefdom. Within this chiefdom existed the Zulu tribe, still a very minor clan. Their chieftain, Senzangakhona, had formed an alliance much earlier with the much larger Mthethwa clan, surrendering to Dingiswayo’s dominance.
Although Senzangakhona achieved much for the clan, his most historically significant accomplishment was meeting a woman named Nandi from the neighbouring Langeni clan, which was also under Mthethwan sovereignty. Their love affair culminated in the conception of a child that Senzangakhona himself attempted to hide, going so far as to term the apparent pregnancy a work of iShaka – an intestinal beetle. Nevertheless, in 1787, Nandi gave birth to a boy named Shaka.
Despite his attempts to deny paternity, Senzangakhona eventually did install Nandi as his third wife. However, after giving birth to their second child and having endured years of mistreatment by the rest of the clan, Nandi, Shaka and his infant sister were exiled by none other than Senzangakhona himself. They subsequently sought refuge with Nandi’s clan of origin, the Langeni, yet were no better received there than they were with the Zulus. At the age of fifteen, Shaka and his family were once again cast out, and so they took themselves to their overlords, the Mthethwa, where they finally felt welcome under the Chieftain Dingiswayo.
Eight years later, the Mthethwa drafted Shaka’s age group into their army where he received military training. At the age of 23, Shaka was tall and powerfully built, and his apparent skill and daring was giving him a natural mastery over his companions. Mthethwa warriors, conscripted into regiments (impis) by age, formed a disciplined force with each regiment distinguished by its dress and the colour of its shields. For Shaka, the battlefield provided a stadium in which he could demonstrate his talents and courage. He quickly attracted the attention of the chieftain, and it did not take long for Shaka to become a commander of his own regiment in Dingiswayo’s army.
As a commander in the Mthethwa army, Shaka became engrossed in problems of strategy and battle tactics. Dingiswayo sought to build alliances with other clans, making his own the central power. His policy was one of carrot and stick, in which he used persuasion where possible and force when necessary. Shaka argued that the policies of persuasion did not produce lasting peace, but rather provided an opportunity for the opposition to regroup and build new alliances. Instead, he suggested that enemies must be totally defeated, and each battle should be one of total war, impi-ebomvu. However, Dingiswayo was reluctant to employ such an aggressive policy.
Regarding actual battle, Shaka rejected entirely the traditional way with which the Mthethwa army fought. They practiced the same form of warfare that Natal tribes had been using for the past 300 years, often called ‘duelling battles’, where each conflict was essentially a replay of the last one. A day and a place would be arranged to settle disputes over cattle or land by combat. On that day the rival tribes arrived at an agreed location, the warriors drawing up in lines at a distance of about 100 yards apart. Behind the lines stood the remaining members of each tribe, who cheered their kinsmen on to greater efforts. All warriors carried five-foot tall, oval, rawhide shields and two or three light javelins. Chosen warriors would advance to within 50 yards of each other, shout insults, and then open the combat by hurling their spears. Eventually, more and more warriors would be drawn into the battle until one side ceased fighting and fled, whereupon a rush would follow for prisoners and cattle. If the pursued dropped their spears, it was a sign of surrender, and no more blood would be shed. Since wounds were seldom fatal, the number of casualties was low.
Shaka recognised the limits to this approach and in 1810 proposed a new standardised strategy with modified weaponry. First, men would be arranged into a close-order, shield-to-shield formation with two ‘horns’ designed to encircle the enemy or to feint at his flanks. The main body of troops would be at the centre, with the reserves in the rear ready to move to wherever needed. Second, to fight effectively in such close-quarters combat, he redesigned the traditional throwing spear and shield. He devised a short stabbing spear with a long double-edge blade which he called an assegai, later known as an iKlwa. Shaka also redesigned the shield, making it bigger and more durable. He taught his regiment, and later the Zulu army, the necessary techniques for using the shield to hook and pull the enemy’s shield, thus exposing their left side to a spear thrust. The introduction of the assegai made the long spear a secondary weapon, used only for an initial attack when the enemy was out of the assegai’s deadly range.
In 1816, with Shaka having spent six years in Dingiswayo’s army, Senzangakhona died. Dingiswayo immediately offered to help Shaka take his father’s position as the Zulu chieftain and lent his young protégé the military support necessary to oust and assassinate his senior brother Sigujana.
Upon seizing the throne, Shaka’s first act was to avenge the terrible treatment of his mother from members of the Zulu and Langeni clans 16 years earlier. This was the first sign of the iron fist with which he would rule his kingdom. His method of punishment involved systematically impaling those who had wronged him on a post around the kraal – village of huts – and giving their cattle to all those who helped him. Over the following two years, he began his reconstruction of the Zulu clan. During this time, he not only commissioned the assegai for his whole army and standardised the bullhorn formation, but also reorganized the Zulu community along Mthethwa military lines based on age.
In 1818, having built his military discriminately so as not to be considered a threat to Dingiswayo, Shaka prepared to join with the Mthethwa in a campaign against the Ndwandwe tribe ruled by Zwide. Prior to this campaign, Dingiswayo’s forces had defeated the Ndwandwe and captured Zwide three times, and Dingiswayo had released him each time. However, when Dingiswayo foolishly went to the Ndwandwe kraal to settle a dispute without an escort of warriors, he was captured and killed by Zwide before the Zulu and Mthethwa regiments could join forces. As the Mthethwa was without leader, Shaka managed to absorb it whole into the Zulu clan within months.
The Zulu’s increased military strength aroused Zwide’s concern that Shaka had taken over as sovereign of northern Natal, so he promptly invaded Zulu territory. Zwide’s army of 10,000 soldiers soon came into contact with the Zulus, now consisting of Mthethwan and Zulu warriors all carrying iKlwas and accustomed to the bullhorn formation at the Battle of Gqokli Hill in 1818. Outnumbered, Shaka established key defensive positions at the summit of Gqokli hill and along the bank of the White Mfolozi River, having used scouts to give himself superior situational awareness of the battlefield. Upon arriving at the river, Zwide’s army found the water still running high, so it could only be crossed at two places.
Once the Ndwandwe forces began to climb the hill, their front started to narrow; by the time they reached the wall the Zulus had formed, Zwide’s troops were so tightly bunched together that their movements were severely restricted. Shaka’s army was therefore able to attack with close combat tactics from unexpected directions, with the Zulus’ iKlwas outperforming their opponent’s longer spear. At this point, the Ndwandwe army was neither prepared nor positioned to withstand a frontal attack, so Shaka employed his bullhorn tactic with the desired end state of enveloping Zwide’s army.
Relying on speed, Shaka lured Zwide’s columns of assault forces forward by first engaging to disrupt their cohesion and then retreating. This caused Zwide’s forces to give chase making it possible for the Zulu “horns” to manoeuvre around their flanks and encircle them. Soon, a running fight erupted as the retreating Ndwandwe army attempted to regroup and reinforce elements from both sides. In response, Shaka’s reserves from the rear of his formation joined in the battle – only 1,000 of Zwide’s soldiers escaped the final Zulu encirclement. Despite this defeat, Zwide remained a strong presence in Natal and in the following year he invaded Zulu territory once more.
In 1820, Zwide and Shaka’s armies engaged in war for the second time at the Battle of Mhlatuze river. By this time, Zwide’s army had adopted Shaka’s battle tactics and weapons, forcing Shaka to change his operational and tactical approach. It was common practice for armies on the march to provision themselves by foraging, and Zwide’s army was no exception. As they crossed into Zulu territory, 18,000 strong, Zwide’s army carried only three days worth of supplies. Anticipating that Zwide’s army would attack after the grain harvest, Shaka had ordered all inhabitants living within 40 miles to store their grain in bags in remote caves and to evacuate all their livestock. Further, he had made every kraal keep only sufficient food for current needs. The Ndwandwe consequently found that neither grain nor livestock were obtainable anywhere.
On the second day of their march into Zulu territory, the 100 oxen that Zwide’s army brought with them trailed. Shaka ordered one of his regiments to attack them, seizing the enemy’s only consistent source of nourishment. Concerned that Zwide’s army would turn back due to hunger, Shaka placed a herd of his oxen within earshot of the starved warriors. Hearing the cry of the oxen, Zwide’s scouts went to pinpoint their location. Shaka then unfolded his first offensive action against the now-vulnerable Ndwandwe army. He sent men into the camp shouting and crying, solely aiming to create panic by disrupting their sleep and causing confusion.
The Zulu raiding party cost Zwide’s soldiers their well-needed night’s rest. So, as they began to retreat in the early morning owing to their acute exhaustion and hunger, Shaka’s main army attacked. The battle lasted for two days and, ultimately, Zwide’s army was defeated – for the second time. Shaka led his reserve seventy miles to Zwide’s kraal and ordered his men to sing a Ndwandwe victory chant as they approached in the dark. Unaware of the scheme, Zwide’s royal kraal came out to greet the returning warriors, however they soon realised their mistake. Zwide once again managed to escape, but he eventually died years later, far north from Zululand. As a result of the Second Ndwandwe-Zulu War, the Ndwandwe kingdom finally fell. This left the Zulu clan as the hegemonic power in Natal, though the tribes in the south that had been ruled by Zwide still needed to be defeated and absorbed.
Shaka’s army ploughed through southern Natal, either incorporating tribes into the Zulu kingdom or driving them away as homeless refugees. By 1824, after a series of long campaigns, Shaka had eclipsed all rivalling clans in Natal, possessing land and power far beyond any of the regional kings that preceded him. In building this kingdom, Shaka relied heavily on the manpower of the aforementioned incorporated clans, using their warriors to form new regiments in his own army. However, the slaughter and terror wrought by this army depopulated a vast region surrounding his kingdom and contributed to a series of forced migrations in various parts of southern Africa. From 1824 onward, the Zulu army had to march across miles of barren land to seize cattle and subdue distant tribes. While eight years earlier, the Zulu had been just another small tribe that only participated in ‘duelling battles’, by now, Shaka had transformed it into an empire which conducted campaigns over great distances.
Shaka had always ruled autocratically. He never eased up when it came to discipline; he would arbitrarily indicate men for death, so almost every day men were seized and killed at his whim. In the latter part of his life, Shaka seemed to take a psychotic turn. The loyalties of his people were severely strained as the frequent cruelties of their great king increased steadily. The climax came in October 1827 upon the death of his mother, Nandi, when some 7,000 Zulus were killed in the initial paroxysm of his grief. He apparently stood motionless for 20 minutes with his head on his shield before letting out frantic yells. He then ordered a general massacre of those not displaying sufficient grief and that for the next year, upon penalty of death, husbands and wives should abstain from sexual intercourse, that cows should not be milked and that crops should not be planted. All women found pregnant were slain with their husbands, as were thousands of cattle, so that even the calves might know what it was to lose a mother.
The interference with the food supply and the erratic brutality of Shaka’s grief eventually evoked the spirit of mutiny among his subjects. When he sent his army to raid the Portuguese settlement at Delagoa Bay in 1828, he left his royal kraal critically lacking protection, so his two brothers, Dingane and Mhlangane, seized the opportunity to assassinate him. They had an accomplice named Mbopa create a diversion while they stuck the fatal blows. Shaka’s corpse was dumped into an empty grain pit, which was then filled with stones and mud. Dingane then had Mhlangane killed, and the returning army, reduced by hunger, fatigue and malaria, proclaimed him king.
Despite the fact that he is widely regarded a blood-lusting tyrant, Shaka Zulu had certain similarities to his French counterpart, Napoleon, hence being dubbed the ‘Black Napoleon’. They both completely revolutionised warfare in their parts of the world, both expanded their people’s land enormously and after all, both died within eight years of each other. Though Shaka’s achievements were not nearly on the same scale as Napoleon’s, his transformative effect is still impressive. At the point of his assassination in 1828, virtually all armies in southern Africa were using his tactics. Following his death, Zulu leaders continued to use Shaka’s system of organization and the strategies he employed until the defeat of the Zulu in 1879. In six years, Shaka had turned a small chieftainship into an empire, yet he ruled it for only six years more.
–
Ross, R., 1999, A Concise History of South Africa.
Otterbein, K. F., 1964, THE EVOLUTION OF ZULU WARFARE, The Kansas Journal of Sociology, 1(1), 27–35, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23308543
Allen, C. R., 2014, Shaka Zulu’s Linkage of Strategy and Tactics: an Early Form of Operational Art?.
Gluckman, M., 1960, THE RISE OF A ZULU EMPIRE, Scientific American, 202(4), 157–169. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24940454