In 1898, Spain lost the overseas possession of Cuba in what came to be known as the Disaster. Beyond the typical economic, political, and material cost of war, the Disaster set a psychological prologue to the turbulence of the next four decades. A symbol of Spain’s decline, it was to cast a shadow on the next generation of Spaniards, driven by the ultimate desire to “wipe out the stain of Cuba”. It left the Spanish military diminished, purposeless, and resentful of the politicians that had seemingly betrayed the Patria (King and Army). Among this generation was Francisco Franco, future Caudillo.
In order to understand the importance of the Disaster, it is necessary to understand the psychological effect it had on Spain, from its civilians to its army. Sebastian Balfour investigates the impact of the Disaster on the Spanish psyche in “The End of the Spanish Empire”, through both the Rif War and the rise of nationalism at home, particularly in Catalonia. Spain’s identity relied heavily on the idea that it was a powerful world player, one with imperial ambitions that were not beyond its reach. This sense of identity was shattered by the humiliating defeat of 1898, in which the country which had once dominated the Americas no longer held any substantial overseas territory. It was now a fallen power in decline. This existential crisis was felt immediately in Spain, with the newspaper El Correo writing on 7 February 1901: “Everything is broken in this unhappy country […] all is fiction, all decadence, all ruins”. Though such psychological impact might seem intangible at first, it had very real implications on the fabric of Spain, manifesting itself in both military and civilian life. Over the course of decades these expressed themselves in events such as the Rif War and La Semana Tragica, before finally coming to a head in the Civil War itself. Thus, Balfour refers to the Disaster as “the original sin from which derived the crisis of Spain in the first part of the twentieth century”.
Francisco Salvad reviews Balfour’s work, outlining the effects of the Disaster further with some qualification. He critiques Balfour’s “excessive emphasis” of 1898, pointing out that government lasted another 25 years. He notes its limited effect on the civilians of Spain: “Far from being a disaster, it was the end of a human tragedy which had cost the lives of thousands of their sons”. Rather, he posited that it was the self-interested ruling elite, and those with power who experienced a challenge to their legitimacy and a crisis of identity. Nevertheless, Salvademphasises the effect that the Disaster had on the growth of militarism within the army. After 1898, the Spanish military was left purposeless, angered, and resentful of the politicians whom they blamed for defeat. Salvad, in his review Balfour’s work, refers to this as “a defeated officerdom seeking and finding a new raison d’être” and that they “began to view themselves as the sole defenders of Spanish nationhood”. The initial pain of the Disaster gave way to a backlash of nationalism and anger against the government, whom they blamed for defeat.
In the years after the Disaster, expansion to Morocco was seen as a way to bring back prestige and counter French dominance. It was initially meant to be a diplomatic, peaceful expansion. However, after agreements in 1900 and 1902 Spain soon found out that it was consigned to being the third power behind Britain and France. La Porte writes that the Anglo-French declaration of 1904 “imposed on Spain the role of a buffer state in order to preserve the interests of Great Britain in the region”. The Moroccan crises of 1905 and 1911, in which Spain played second fiddle to Britain and France against Germany, all but confirmed its secondary status. When the Spanish protectorate of Morocco established on 27 November 1912 by the Treaty of Fez was met with heavy resistance, the process of military action began in Morocco.
The rise in militarism caused by the Disaster led to political and civil unrest. This is seen most clearly in the insurgency of “La Semana Trgica” or “The Tragic week”, the first major event of political violence on the road to Civil War. On 9 July 1909, Spain resumed military-colonial activity in Morocco, known as the Second Melilla Campaign, with Premier Maura conscripting all reserve troops. This was met with widespread unrest throughout Spain, with many of the reserve troops being the sole breadwinners for their families. Unions such as “Solidaridad Obrera” called strikes, beginning a week of dissent by anarchists, socialists, and republicans, met with military force. The newspaper “La Actualidad” described vividly the burning of churches and convents in Barcelona. Moreover, Pablo La Porte asserts that events such as La Semana were among “some of the most acute political crises that undermined the fragile political regime”.
Morocco was to prove disastrous from the outset, and far from winning back prestige, the campaign only served to damage the credibility of the Spanish army further. For example, a total of 9000 Spaniards were massacred at Dar Drius, Melilla, Monte Arruit, and Nador. Further, the occupation of Tetuan in 1913 evinced the poor state of the army, as well as the government’s inability to control it. The Liberal government had been pressured by General Alfau to occupy Tetuan on the condition that the operation was conducted “without firing a shot”. The failure to do so only heightened Moroccan animosity towards occupation, and the news was received with fury in Madrid. The impact of Spain’s prolonged and violent campaigns in Morocco in the 1910s was highly significant; it undermined their credibility to govern and rule. Whilst the French zone was “regarded as a model of peace, progress and prosperity”, in the Spanish zone “sometimes even the high commissioner was not aware of the operations his subordinates were undertaking”. Further, it exposed the government’s fundamental lack of authority over the army, who resented any political interference in Morocco. Thus, the situation in Morocco created an autonomous, powerful, and resentful army, an ingredient vital both the military coup of 1923, the uprising of 1936, and the Civil War itself.
Early failures in Morocco were magnified with the commencement of the Rif War in 1921, when Berber tribe leader Abd El Krim proclaimed the independent Rif Republic. The war proved severely damaging to Spain’s international reputation; not only had their military been embarrassed in the years prior, but public opinion was firmly against them. Indeed, the British Vice Consul in Marrakech wrote: “The sympathy of both classes and masses is entirely with Abd El Krim”. A devastating defeat for the Spanish at the Battle of Annual in July 1921 further exposed the deficiency of leadership, strategy, and organisation within the Spanish chain of command. This provoked Spanish reprisals, destroying the military’s reputation further. Notably, one story involved a young General Franco, then commander of the Spanish Legion: he laughed at the sight of mutilated Moroccan women and children, describing it as revenge for “the most exemplary punishment ever seen down the generations”. The struggle to win both battles and opinion only increased resentment of the Spanish government by the army. The schism between military and government culminated on 13 September 1923, when General Miguel Primo de Rivera launched a military coup and overthrew the government.
The dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, itself caused by the campaign on Morocco, in turn helped hasten the path to Civil War in a number of ways. This is best exemplified in the reasons for its collapse in 1930, caused by a combination of civil, military, and political uprising; key aspects of the Civil War six years later. Firstly, the unity that the military showed in the 1923 coup d’tat did not last; indeed, General Queipo de Llano claimed to have visited Franco in September 1924 to discuss a possible coup against de Rivera. Further, Morocco proved yet again to be an area of tension between government and military, with an inconsistent policy that alienated both junteros (troops stationed in Spain) and africanistas (troops stationed in Africa) alike. Primo initially supported the junteros’ abandonista policy of reducing involvement in Morocco; this led to accusations of “passivity and inaction” by Franco, now a Brigadier General. For example, in an infamous episode Franco reportedly served Primo a meal entirely of eggs as a jibe at his perceived cowardliness. Primo then supported the africanistas, aggravating the divide in the Spanish army even further. The consequences of this can be seen in the two attempts at coup prior to 1930; the “Sanjuanada” in June 1926 led by liberal generals, followed by a second attempt in January 1929 led by conservative politicians. By the time of the 1930 coup, the mandate of Spain was clear, even in sectors of the military. The “Unión Militar Republicana” proclaimed: “We want to go to an essentially democratic Republic by means of a popular movement supported by the Army”. In this way, Primo’s leadership and inability to control the army he had united in 1923 alienated both military and politicians alike, leading to his resignation on 28 January 1930.
The Spanish Second Republic can be seen as the point where the triggers for Civil War fit into the context of the decades-long developments behind them. During the Spanish Second Republic, the Spanish military problem left unsolved by Primo, expanded into a wider political problem. Primo’s lack of reform had fostered an environment of “class division and hatred” according to Payne. Luis Romero analyses how this came to fruition under the republic, with the violence between anarchists, revolutionary anarcho-syndicalist unions, and socialists, which heavily led to the uprising of 1936: “The government proved incapable of maintaining order, and bloody incidents including deaths and severe wounds – stained all of Spain”. This cost the government legitimacy of rule, and encouraged dissent and resistance. For example, the assassination of monarchist leader Jos Sotelo on 12 July 1936, a reprisal for the killing of socialist Lieutenant Castillo, encouraged the remaining neutral men in the military to participate in the brewing uprising. Thus, Payne describes it as “the final precipitant of civil war”. Franco then used the assassination to legitimise the coup d’tat of 1936, when on 17 July he led the Spanish Army of Africa to attack the mainland, beginning the Civil War.
The roots of the Spanish Civil War, therefore, can be traced back several decades. A chain of causation can be pieced together, beginning with the Disaster in 1898, followed by conflict with Morocco, the military coup of 1923, and the unstable Second Republic. Collectively, these formed the perfect ingredients for Civil War.
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