On 14 April 1931, the Second Spanish Republic was proclaimed under a provisional government of Niceto Alcalá-Zamora, following the deposition of King Alfonso XIII. With the Constitution established on 9 December that same year by the elected government of Manuel Azaña, there was a sense of cautious hope across the country. Indeed, in early 1932, Asturian newspaper Avance described how communities had been “awoken in an explosion of sleeping desires and repressed impulses.”[1]This hope offered both an opportunity for reform but also the weight of expectation. The descent from democracy into Civil War was not to be immediate, but rather it was gradual. By 1934, Asturias would become an epicentre of rebellion and by 1936 the Republic was coming undone. Finally, on 17 July 1936, General Emilio Mola and General Francisco Franco (future Caudillo) launched a military coup against the Popular Front government. It is the purpose of this essay to assess the causes of the failure of the Second Spanish Republic in the lead up to the Civil War, and to contend that its failure was primarily due to the ineffectiveness of government in addressing the needs of the country.
The issue of social division is seen perhaps most clearly in the agrarian sector, plagued by the Latifundia system, rural poverty, strikes, and an unhappy peasantry. This was addressed inadequately from the outset. For example, on 21 May 1931, Azaña’s government created the Institute of Agrarian Reform. Yet, as Antony Beevor notes, “its budget was only 50 million pesetas, a totally inadequate amount for the task.”[2]Indeed, any attempt at agrarian reform was met with deep suspicion from the centre and right of politics, fearing how far it might venture into socialism. This can be seen in the fierce debate over Article 44, the “expropriation of land in the national interest”[3]demanded by the socialists. The impact of the government’s lack of progress was great. For example, Sara Schatz describes that the peasantry’s lack of support for agrarian reforms, as well as the continued power of the landed elites, were “central factors in explaining the rise of fascism in Spain.”[4]Discontent regarding the reforms would contribute to strikes and dissent across the country, chiefly in the form of political massacres (such as at Casas Viejas) and strike action (such as the Asturian rebellion). Moreover, it alienated the Catholic Church from government further, a relationship already fractured from the Church burnings of 1931 throughout Malaga, Madrid and Seville. The agrarian reforms reinforced the perception that the Left were determined to persecute the Church; thus, the Right’s warning of “godless, Communist inspired violence”[5]struck a nerve. Combined with the Church’s stance that “a vote for the right was a vote for Christ”[6], this widened the political gulf between Right and Left and severely damaged the Republic’s credibility as a government, seen in the form of political violence and resistance in rural areas of the country. Thus, government ineffectiveness was the most important factor in dismantling Spanish democracy, as its poor handling of issues such as agrarian reform formed the foundation for subsequent violence, strike action, and political polarisation.
The Republic also failed to rectify the country’s fractured political situation and extreme ideological division between socialists, communists, fascists and other factions, crippling its ability to govern throughout its tenure. This can be seen particularly in the case of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE), which steadily became more radical; Paul Preston terms this the “Social Schism.” He attributes socialist violence to the “disillusion with the paucity of the Republic’s reforming achievement.”[7]The government had done little to quell existing polarisation in the decades before the Civil War through reform, and this divide had only increased. For example, Beevor argues that the conflict between socialists and Falangists was key, stoking fear and suspicion across all sides of the political spectrum. Indeed, there was a strongly communist note to the socialists in the form of Largo Caballero, leader of the PSOE, who was Spain’s most bolshevised figure; El Socialista proclaimed: “We are determined to do in Spain what has been done in Russia.”[8]This led to the Spanish Communist Party setting up its own paramilitary arm to take on the Falangist party. The first victim was a judge, Manuel Pedregal, and on 14 April a bomb exploded next to the presidential saluting stand.
It is important to ascertain how much influence the government actually had and whether, if it had been more effective, the Republic could have survived. For example, Pamela Radcliff posits that the governments of the Republic could have done little to prevent Civil War. Instead, she takes a more macro-view, arguing that the demise of Spain’s democracy was due to a decades-long ideological struggle. She describes “two Spains in mortal combat”[11]to denote how polarisation on all spectrums (social, political, economic), left unchecked, could only result in civil war. The implication is that the Republic, overwhelmed with countless issues from agrarian reform to Catalan independence, could do little to mitigate civil war. However, I find Radcliff’s argument unconvincing; Spain’s political and social issues were not only left unsolved, but were aggravated by the incompetence of government throughout the Republic’s time. Both Preston and Beevor’s arguments hold more weight, accurately portraying how the government’s failure to address social issues deepened the political gulf, which translated to political violence, culminating in the collapse of Spanish democracy with the outbreak of war. It gave credence to Franco’s warning of a “red conspiracy”[12], and legitimised the coup of 1936. Thus, ineffective governance can be seen as its major cause.
A factor worth mentioning is social unrest. Azaña’s government had inherited a poor situation from Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship, and failures to address the underlying issues led to widespread social unrest. Luis Romero analyses how this came to fruition under the Republic, with the violence between anarchists, revolutionary anarcho-syndicalist unions, and socialists, heavily contributing to the uprising of 1936: “The government proved incapable of maintaining order, and bloody incidents including deaths and severe wounds – stained all of Spain.”[13]Throughout the summer of 1931, the government declared martial law, with the Benemerita (Civil Guard) ruthlessly putting down scattered dissent. At Toledo, after embattled peasants attempted to seize pieces of farmland, five were left dead. Beevor outlines how any attempts to suppress resistance by the government were weaponised as propaganda for the Right. For example, in infamous town of Casas Viejas, a group of anarchists began to revolt and 22 peasants were killed. As a result, “The Right, which had often called for harsh measures to restore order, now attacked Azaña for brutality.” Even though Azaña had little control over events, they cost the Republic government legitimacy of rule. Far from reducing resistance, they only fanned its flames.
Stanley G Payne describes how this soon grew into more organised forms of dissent, spearheaded by the unions. Chief among these was the CNT (Confederación Nacional del Trabajo), whose main attempt to destabilise the Republic came in the form of los tres ochos (the three ‘eights’).[14]These were revolutionary insurrections on 8 January 1932, 8 January 1933, and 8 December 1933. Acts of terrorism (such as the derailing of a train in Valencia), and killings of hundreds of police officers and civilians occurred. Nevertheless, Payne concedes that “although each was a major nuisance, none was a threat to the state and system.” However, this would soon arrive with the Revolution of October 1934, in which the Asturian miner’s strike, the most significant strike action of the period, took centre stage. Preston points to the shock effect this gave the bourgeoisie and upper classes, and argues that this was the point of no return on the road to civil war: “The vengeful repression urged by the Right and carried out by the Radical-CEDA coalition convinced many on the Left that electoral disunity must never be risked again.”[15]Indeed, over 1200 suffered violent deaths in the insurrection; as such, Fernando del Rey argues that “no one can deny the impact of political violence on Spanish democracy.”[16]However, though political violence and polarisation were significant, both Preston and del Rey’s interpretations that it was majorly important, is unconvincing. Far from being primary drivers of the collapse of Spanish democracy, they were essentially a product of ineffective governance. For example, in the Asturian strike, Adrian Schubert contends that “the disillusion resulting from the failure of the Republic to deal successfully with the miners’ problems is central.”[17]This would strongly suggest that social unrest was not as significant as the ineffectiveness of successive Republic governments as it was itself caused by the government’s inability to reform Spanish society. Thus, social unrest can be seen as subsidiary to government incompetence.
The discontent of the Spanish military with the Republic was also significant in precipitating its demise. Preston points to the alienation of the army from the state which came primarily from the military reforms of the Republic governments, particularly those of Manuel Azaña, who sought to reorganise it, but most of all, to control it. For example, the Promesa de Fidelidad, a decree on 21 April 1931 ordered every soldier to take an oath of loyalty to the Republic. The army was monarchist, right wing, and deeply religious; the Republic represented everything against that. General Franja epitomised the general sentiment, saying that he had “offered up his humiliation to the Patria.”[18]This was made yet worse by the Ley Azaña, which offered voluntary retirement on full pay, with the caveat that those deemed surplus who did not volunteer would receive nothing. This deepened the rift between state and army, evinced by the words of General Reguera, who expressed his disgust at “serving these people and their dishcloth of a flag”[19]On 10 August 1932, the frustration of the military found an outlet in the Sanjurada, a military coup led by General Sanjurjo. However, the government was well aware of conspiratorial plans, resulting in a “humiliating failure”[20]for the army. This harmed the army’s reputation further, increasing animosity towards the government. Additionally government’s reliance on the army in crushing the 1934 Rebellion reinforced its confidence in overthrowing it and seemed to legitimise the 1936 coup. Del Rey describes this: “a breakdown in public order can legitimise a military rebellion.”[21]Needless to say, the outbreak of war was driven by the military, when on 17 July 1936 General Franco led the Spanish Army of Africa from the city of Melilla to attack the mainland. Therefore, the dissatisfaction of the military with the government was significant in destabilising the Republic, though ultimately subsidiary. This is because the reasons for military discontent essentially arose from the government’s policies and management of the army, which angered its officers and turned its soldiers against the Patria. Moreover, the Republic’s image as irreligious, communist-leaning, and progressive came from its inability to both reform and to unite the political and social fabric of Spain. This evinces why government ineffectiveness was the most important factor in the demise of the Second Republic.
The question of the decline of the Spanish Second Republic seems to blur the lines between cause and effect, between the problems in Spanish society and the failure of the government to address them adequately. I contend that although the governments of the Republic were not culpable for the situations they inherited, responsibility for the outcome lies with them. Rather than mitigating war, their policies only hastened it. Political violence, social unrest, and military discontent were all products of the primary cause, which was the inefficiency of the government. Ultimately, the Republic was burdened by the expectations and hopes that were placed on it from its inception. Indeed, a romantic notion of the Republic persists to this day, as an innocent victim of the rise of Fascism in Europe.[22] The Spanish Second Republic was far from this idealised vision, but it was not as calamitous as Francoist interpretations would hold. The initial promise of the Republic turned sour, the enthusiasm of the people turned to apathy, the frustration of the military became anger, and unrest became rebellion. Perhaps above all, it was the “civil war that could have been averted until the very end.”[23]
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Beevor, A. (2007b). The battle for Spain : the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939. London: Phoenix.
Kerry, Matthew. “Building and Contesting the Republic (1931–2).” In Unite, Proletarian Brothers!:
Radicalism and Revolution in the Spanish Second Republic, 49–70. University of London Press, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvvb7kkc.8.
Luis Romero, Por que y como mataron a Calvo Sotelo (Barcelona 1982), 56-8.
Payne, Stanley G. “Political Violence during the Spanish Second Republic.” Journal of Contemporary History 25, no. 2/3 (1990): 269–88. http://www.jstor.org/stable/260733.
Preston, P. (1994). Franco. New York : BasicBooks, a division of HarperCollins. Chapter 5
Preston, Paul. “The Origins of the Socialist Schism in Spain, 1917-31.” Journal of Contemporary History 12, no. 1 (1977): 101–32. http://www.jstor.org/stable/260239.
Radcliff, P. (2004). From mobilization to civil war : the politics of polarization in the Spanish city of Gijón, 1900-1937. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
Rey, Fernando del. “The Spanish Second Republic and Political Violence.” Journal of Contemporary History 51, no. 2 (2016): 430-435.http://www.jstor.org/stable/24671850.
Schatz, Sara. “Democracy’s Breakdown and the Rise of Fascism: The Case of the Spanish Second Republic, 1931-6.” Social History 26, no. 2 (2001): 145s. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4286762.
Shubert, Adrian. “Revolution in Self-Defence: The Radicalization of the Asturian Coal Miners, 1921-34.” Social History 7, no. 3 (1982): 265-282. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4285189.
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[1] Kerry, Matthew. “Building and Contesting the Republic (1931–2).” In Unite, Proletarian Brothers!: Radicalism and Revolution in the Spanish Second Republic, 49–70. University of London Press, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvvb7kkc.
[2] Beevor, A. (2007b). The battle for Spain : the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939. London: Phoenix. 24.
[3] Beevor, A. (2007b). The battle for Spain : the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939. London: Phoenix. 27.
[4] Schatz, Sara. “Democracy’s Breakdown and the Rise of Fascism: The Case of the Spanish Second Republic, 1931-6.” Social History 26, no. 2 (2001): 145. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4286762.
[5] Preston, P. (1994). Franco. New York : BasicBooks, a division of HarperCollins. 130.
[6] Beevor, A. (2007b). The battle for Spain : the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939. London: Phoenix. 39.
[7] Preston, Paul. “The Origins of the Socialist Schism in Spain, 1917-31.” Journal of Contemporary History 12, no. 1 (1977): 101–32. http://www.jstor.org/stable/260239.
[8]Beevor, A. (2007b). The battle for Spain : the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939. London: Phoenix. 40.
[9]Payne, Stanley G. “Political Violence during the Spanish Second Republic.” Journal of Contemporary History 25, no. 2/3 (1990): 269–88. http://www.jstor.org/stable/260733.
[10]Beevor, A. (2007b). The battle for Spain : the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939. London: Phoenix. 54.
[11]Pamela Beth Radcliff (2004). From mobilization to civil war : the politics of polarization in the Spanish city of Gijón, 1900-1937. pg. 1. Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
[12]Beevor, A. (2007b). The battle for Spain : the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939. London: Phoenix. 34.
[13] Luis Romero, Por que y como mataron a Calvo Sotelo (Barcelona 1982), 56-8.
[14]Payne, Stanley G. “Political Violence during the Spanish Second Republic.” Journal of Contemporary History 25, no. 2/3 (1990): 274. http://www.jstor.org/stable/260733.
[15]Preston, P. (1994). Franco. New York : BasicBooks, a division of HarperCollins.108.
[16]Rey, Fernando del. “The Spanish Second Republic and Political Violence.” Journal of Contemporary History 51, no. 2 (2016): 434. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24671850.
[17] Shubert, Adrian. “Revolution in Self-Defence: The Radicalization of the Asturian Coal Miners, 1921-34.” Social History 7, no. 3 (1982): 269. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4285189.
[18]Preston, P. (1994). Franco. New York : BasicBooks, a division of HarperCollins. 75.
[19]Preston, P. (1994). Franco. New York : BasicBooks, a division of HarperCollins. 75.
[20]Beevor, A. (2007b). The battle for Spain : the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939. London: Phoenix. 29.
[21]Rey, Fernando del. “The Spanish Second Republic and Political Violence.” Journal of Contemporary History 51, no. 2 (2016): 433. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24671850.
[22] Rey, Fernando del. “The Spanish Second Republic and Political Violence.” Journal of Contemporary History 51, no. 2 (2016): 431. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24671850.
[23]Rey, Fernando del. “The Spanish Second Republic and Political Violence.” Journal of Contemporary History 51, no. 2 (2016): 434. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24671850.