The Roman Late Republic’s decline stemmed from a convergence of factors: internal elite discord, political militarisation, escalating political violence, and institutional deficiencies. Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon epitomised this tipping point, catalysing events that eroded traditional governance. As personal ambition conflicted with entrenched interests and military loyalty eclipsed allegiance to the Senate, the Republic came ever closer to collapse. Systemic weaknesses, exacerbated by imperial expansion, accelerated the shift from Republic to Principate, signifying the ascendancy of individual ambition over collective governance.
What is interesting in historiographical terms is that, much like the contentious debate surrounding the causes of the Roman Late Republic’s decline, pinpointing the exact moment of its collapse lacks objective consensus. Compelling arguments have been made regarding key events in the Roman Late Republic’s decline, such as the formation of the Crassus-Caesar-Pompey triumvirate, Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon, and Octavian’s victory at the Battle of Actium over Antony. However, most would consider Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon as the principal catalyst for the Republic’s downfall. This decisive act set off a chain of tumultuous events that disrupted the Republic’s traditional order. Throughout these developments, the structural weaknesses inherent in the Republic played a pivotal role, notably exemplified by the waning authority of the Senate and systemic constitutional shortcomings. These vulnerabilities were exploited by ambitious individuals seeking political ascension, resulting in fatal damage to the Republic’s stability and integrity.
The initial stages of the Republic’s collapse were characterised by a gradual erosion of consensual governance, marked by escalating divisions within the Roman elite. This phenomenon can be contextualised within the longstanding ‘Conflict of the Orders’, a historical struggle between the patrician and plebeian classes for political influence. The enduring legacy of this conflict resulted in a nuanced and somewhat paradoxical institutional framework with political power-sharing between the patricians and the plebeians, wherein the sources of political power became increasingly blurred. Nonetheless, as many aspiring plebeian families were integrated into a new patrician-plebeian nobilitas, the conflict reached Rome’s ruling class. The trigger finally came in 133 BC, when Tiberius Gracchus proposed a series of far-reaching land reforms, disrupting the precarious balance of power between officeholders. Gracchus’s ambitious program of agrarian reform threatened the interests of many within the ruling elite; having to sacrifice the bulk of their ager publicus, they would lose out most.
Furthermore, in the process, Gracchus not only broke with convention by stripping a fellow tribune of his office but also took over the financial and administrative responsibilities of the senate by deciding himself what should be done with the fortune of King Attalus of Pergamum. Both actions were entirely without precedent. However, he defended the deposition of the tribune Octavius by arguing that the greatest crime for a tribune was not an act of treachery against the Republic but rather disobedience to the plebs. Thus, by subordinating his allegiance to the Republic to the interests of the plebs, he set in motion a decline of consensual government, epitomised by the increased use of assemblies without senatorial approval. Both Appian and Plutarch agree on the gravity of Gracchus’s land reform in causing division, with Appian claiming that he “had sown in Italy so many seeds of future strife”.
One direct consequence was the new fragmentation within the ruling class between the optimates, those who upheld the authority of the senate, and the populares, those who looked to the people. By setting the precedents for later activity, Gracchus was a key actor in the crisis. His example was used countless times by aspiring populares, many of whom simply used the plebs as a tool to gain political power. Sallust, for his part, alludes to the increasing polarisation of Roman society by describing two factions: those seeking dignitas and those seeking libertas. Ultimately, this conflict would have dire consequences for the Republic. The significant role of division between the populares and the optimates is clearest in 49. Caesar defied the senate by continuing to hold onto his imperium, declaring that the senate itself was defying the enactments of the people that gave him the freedom to stand for the consulship in absentia before relinquishing his imperium, a self-evident reflection of Gracchus’s arguments as recorded in Plutarch. However, similar divisions emerged during the first Civil War between Marius and Sulla, reflecting the fractious nature of Roman society in the Late Republic. Sulla exacerbated these divisions by diminishing the authority of popular assemblies, reinstating senatorial dominance. This ongoing struggle is exemplified by Caesar’s eventual march on Rome, spurred by the Senate’s political intransigence.
Moreover, Caesar’s ability to challenge the established order was contingent upon military backing. In the Late Republic, armies shifted allegiance from the Senate to individual commanders, serving as instruments for personal political gain rather than the Republic’s welfare. This shift was intricately linked to the relationship between land ownership and military service. Traditionally, the pre-Marian armies of the Roman Republic were made up of property-owning citizens (assidui) who had a stake in the fighting, which guaranteed allegiance to the Republic. Furthermore, these soldiers would return to their farms after the end of the campaign season, precluding the need for generals to help with their retirement prospects. Nonetheless, as the number of landless Romans increased, driven by the debts of farms abandoned due to longer campaigns and a failure to compete with the large, commercial estates of the elite, it was becoming increasingly difficult to enlist enough men. Consequently, the requirement for military service steadily declined from 11,000 asses to 1,500 asses around the time of the Gracchan reforms. Marius’ supplementum of 107 BC reformed the recruitment process further, opening military service to the capite censi who had previously been excluded, the final step to creating a professional fighting force. Soldiers now depended entirely on their generals to support them, causing a shift in allegiance from the state to the commanders themselves. Paradoxically, therefore, Marius made the Roman army a better fighting force but one that was less loyal.
At the hands of ambitious generals, armies could become political instruments. Generals could now use armies as a source of power to challenge the status quo, indirectly or directly. To prove this switch of allegiance, when Sulla marched on Rome in 88 BC, only one of his senatorial officers initially chose to follow him, while the entire army was virtually unanimous in doing so. And it’s no coincidence that Sulla’s example was followed many times after as the Republic reached its twilight phase. Having little faith in the state’s ability to provide better prospects, soldiers were unlikely to oppose their commander. The Senate’s reluctance to support retired generals is exemplified by the blocking of proposals to settle Pompey’s veterans under tribune Flavius. Although the Senate did approve land allotments for veterans of the Sertorian War under the Lex Plotia, this was an exception. Pompey leveraged fears of retaining his army in 70 BC to pressure the Senate. Similarly, Caesar resorted to violence to enact his agrarian reform in 59 BC. This situation underscored soldiers’ indifference towards constitutional matters, prioritising loyalty to self-interested generals. Consequently, the ease with which generals could sway their soldiers allowed them considerable latitude to act independently, thereby leveraging the army as a tool to dismantle the Republic’s structure, as exemplified by Sulla and later Caesar.
The rise of violence in the Late Republic stemmed from escalating societal divisions and served as a means to circumvent mounting opposition. Political violence became pervasive during this period, employed to enact legislation, sway electoral outcomes, and eliminate adversaries. This cycle of violence perpetuated itself, with retaliation leading to further escalation and eventual descent into Civil War. Above all, the Social War provides a prime example of this, as violence became the instrument for driving the agenda of the allies. Indeed, understanding the political atmosphere, the allies realised that they would not be granted citizenship if they remained still; only by violence and force might they be able to obtain citizenship. Moreover, the Social War showed how violence could quickly spiral into greater conflict, establishing war as a possible feature of political violence. The Social War precipitated the Civil War, intensifying political violence, which escalated rapidly. The ensuing period witnessed unprecedented brutality, exemplified by the proscriptions that institutionalised mass-scale violence. Sulla exploited these tactics to implement reforms unopposed. Subsequent instances of violence, such as Spartacus’ revolt and the conspiracy of 63 BC, mirrored earlier precedents. Mob violence, exemplified by Clodius and Milo under the First Triumvirate, further destabilised Rome, culminating in internal conflict and war. By Caesar’s time, political violence had become ingrained in society, rendering his march on Rome in 49 BC a predictable outcome of prevailing circumstances.
In large part, the utilisation of violence was a result of weaknesses inherent in the Republican system of government. The Republic was, in a way, almost a victim of its own success. Rome’s institutions were designed with a city-state in mind. Consequently, as Rome expanded into a global rather than provincial power, these traditional institutions could no longer cope. The collapse of the Republic was therefore a direct consequence of its territorial expansion, and the failure of attempts to restore the Republic to its traditional state, for example by Sulla, simply demonstrated that Rome was unequipped to meet the demands of its ever-growing ‘empire’. Ironically, its self-professed, staunchest supporters—men such as Cato and Bibulus—were responsible for accelerating the Republic’s demise by clinging on to an outdated mode of government. Therefore, violence became the primary tool to overcome the weaknesses and inefficacy of the Republic’s outdated system of government.
The ‘First Triumvirate’ shows this theory in action since it was designed to circumvent the difficulties that its founders—Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus—faced by the senate. The alliance of the three influential men using armed gangs allowed them to overcome their opposition. For instance, Caesar’s law of 59 was passed despite fierce resistance using force and illegal means. Rome’s expansion provided avenues for personal advancement, enabling individuals to exploit the outdated institutional framework of the city-state. As Rome’s territorial reach extended, the Senate struggled to assert control over military commanders. Pompey’s autonomy in Asia Minor and Caesar’s unilateral actions in Gaul underscored the Senate’s inability to curb their power. Moreover, upon their return to Rome, the Senate lacked the authority to constrain their influence, as evidenced by Pompey’s triumphs and seemingly conferred consulship in 71 BC, as recounted by Plutarch. At the age of only 36, Pompey had achieved the top magistracy—the consulship—below the minimum age and without having held a formal magistracy in his life. Evidently, the expansion of the state and its territory, necessitated the creation of extraordinary special commands to make up for Rome’s long-running weaknesses of government. Above all, the lex Gabinia is the supreme example of this in action. Providing Pompey with proconsular imperium over virtually all of Rome’s overseas territory to deal with the immediate problem of piracy, the proposal gave Pompey unprecedented powers that made him a potential threat to the Republic and a model for other ambitious individuals.
Another inherent weakness of Rome’s political system lay in its lack of a codified constitution. While it nonetheless may be described as having an informal or uncodified constitution, the Roman constitution’s reliance on precedent and the mos maiorum could corrupt the fundamental ideals that it set out to preserve, fuelling instability. The debate over the lex Gabinia in Rome illuminates some of these issues: on the one hand, the people viewed the command as in accordance with the constitution, whilst many in the senate, based on Dio’s account, opposed the measure. Another weak point in Rome’s constitution was the ease with which bills could be passed. Laws mandated by the populus were simple to obtain yet could be far-reaching in their scope and implications. Laws were also equally simple to overturn and replace since the most recent law always took precedence. This damaged the Republic as laws were revoked as quickly as they were enforced, as was the case with Sulla’s reforms in restoring senatorial supremacy. The observance of uncodified rules and ancestral customs depended heavily on societal cohesion and a respect for the unwritten components of the constitution. Thus, when these notions broke down and faded under the influence of powerful individuals, the Republic broke down with them, and a new form of government better suited to command an empire came to fruition.
To conclude, Rome’s transformation from Republic to Principate marked the victory of the individual over the collective. The very purpose of the Republic was to replace the power of the kings that came before it. As the Republic entered its twilight phase, it could no longer contain the individuals that placed their own personal advancement above both the collective and the Republic itself. By the second century AD, the triumph of the individual had been fully realised: the senate was virtually defunct while a single individual ruled supreme.
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