Napoleon’s Greatest Campaign?

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In the aftermath of the disastrous Battle of Leipzig in October 1813, or ‘Battle of the Nations’, in which Napoleon lost more than 60,000 men as well as 325 cannon, the armies of the Sixth Coalition marched on France herself. Having rejected the Frankfurt Proposals of November, which would have kept him on the throne, the French Emperor was without allies or escape. Former Marshals Joachim Murat, now King of Naples, and Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte, now Crown Prince Charles John of Sweden, marched against him, with the latter directly threatening France’s holdings in northern Italy. But it was in north-east France that the campaign of 1814 was focused. In January, Prussian Field Marshal Gebhard von Blücher’s 70,000-strong Army of Silesia crossed the Rhine alongside the Austrian Generalissimo Schwarzenberg and his 210,000-man Army of Bohemia. Marching north from their crossing points near Switzerland, the two armies outnumbered Napoleon four to one. With just 70,000 men at his disposal, the majority of whom were raw conscripts, the odds were entirely against the French Emperor. However, for the first time since Marengo in 1800, Napoleon had so few men he would be able to directly control every element of his army. What followed was arguably the greatest individual campaign of all time, combining audacity with strategic prowess to shock, confuse and terrify Coalition commanders.

At Brienne on 29 January Napoleon tried to destroy 30,000 men of Blücher’s dispersed command; however, he was unable to trap the Prussian who fell back to the safety of Schwarzenberg’s massive force. Two days later, on 1 February, Blücher made a surprise attack on French camps in the village of La Rothière. Under heavy pressure from the front and with a Bavarian Corps beginning to engage his left flank, Napoleon was forced to retreat south across the Aube River. Now within 200 kilometres of Paris, Schwarzenberg elected to march along the Seine River to strike the capital while Blücher would head further north, following the Marne. While in theory a sound tactic — as the outnumbered French could not cover both routes — the aggressive Blücher quickly advanced much further than the conservative Schwarzenberg, encumbered by his long columns.

Leaving two of his Corps behind to watch the Seine crossings and protect his rear, Napoleon took 30,000 men north to attack Blücher’s again-scattered troops. Here began the so-called ‘Six Days’ Campaign’ as the French conducted a series of forced marches and fast attacks to throw back the Army of Silesia. On 10 February the Emperor caught and destroyed the 4,000 men of Russia’s IX Corps at Champaubert. The next day, he attacked 20,000 men under General Osten-Sacken, one of Blücher’s senior commanders, near the town of Montmirail. Using his feared Vieille Garde (“Old Guard”) in shock attacks against the Russians, Napoleon inflicted 3,500 casualties to his own 1,800. On 12 February the two armies fought a rearguard action in the town of Château-Thierry as Osten-Sacken sought to retreat north of the Marne. He was successful in doing so, and in destroying the town’s bridge in the process, but not without a further 3,000 casualties. Marching back down the road towards Montmirail, Napoleon attacked Blücher at Vauchamps on 14 February, winning a major victory over the allies. With fewer than 1,000 French losses, the Coalition suffered 9,000 men killed, wounded or captured at the hands of the Emperor. In the six days between 10 and 15 February Napoleon had attacked and beaten an army twice his own size. Blücher is estimated to have lost 15,000 men in the four defeats he suffered that week, alongside a further 15,000 as his stragglers and deserters were slaughtered by marauding French cavalrymen.

While the French had mauled the Army of Silesia on the Marne, Schwarzenberg’s Army of Bohemia in the south had continued effectively unimpeded and were now within 70 kilometres of Paris. The two Corps Napoleon had left under Oudinot and Victor were forced to stand by as Schwarzenberg’s vast army lumbered across the Seine. On 17 February Napoleon returned to the Seine front as Schwarzenberg, shocked by the collapse of Blücher’s army, gave the order for his Corps to fall back. However, the advance guard under Russian General Wittgenstein received the order too late and faced Napoleon alone at Mormant. Rewarded with 3,000 losses, Wittgenstein was forced to retreat across the Seine the next day. Napoleon continued directly south to seize the vital bridges in the town of Montereau, held by a Corps of his former allies in the Confederation of the Rhine, Württemberg. After inflicting 6,000 casualties — a third of the enemy’s strength — Montereau was taken.

Despite this success, Napoleon’s situation continued to deteriorate. Several major French cities such as Nancy and Dijon had willingly opened their gates to the allies, while further south the advancing Duke of Wellington had been welcomed into Bordeaux by a city now declaring itself in support of the Bourbon Kings. On 1 March the allies signed the Treaty of Chaumont, committing themselves not to negotiate separately with the French Emperor or to disband their armies. This unified stance sunk Napoleon’s hopes for a favourable peace or a split in the allied camp.

By 27 February Blücher had resumed his advance on Paris and Napoleon was again forced to march north, leaving Macdonald to watch Schwarzenberg, who had retreated behind the Aube. This time, however, Blücher escaped across the Marne before he could be attacked. A subsequent plan to trap the Army of Silesia as they attempted to cross the Aisne was thwarted when the French garrison guarding the major bridges in Soissons surrendered. At Craonne on 7 March the French took Russian positions, but not before losing at least 5,000 men. Two days later, at the Battle of Laon, Napoleon attacked Blücher’s full army of 90,000 men, despite again being outnumbered two to one. This time he was repulsed with 6,500 casualties he could seldom afford and forced to fall back across the Aisne. In the south, Schwarzenberg had turned around and begun to march along the Seine, sweeping Marshal Macdonald aside.

On 20 March at Arcis-sur-Aube, Schwarzenberg and Napoleon finally met. Having moved south to drive the Austrian general back, Napoleon believed he faced only Schwarzenberg’s rearguard; assuming he was retreating as he had before, he was wrong. Emboldened by Blücher’s success at Laon, Schwarzenberg intended to hold his ground and fight the badly outnumbered French Emperor in the river town. After two days of fighting, Napoleon was forced to retreat, both sides having lost 4,000 men. Desperate to halt the march on Paris, Napoleon planned to move between Schwarzenberg and Blücher, cutting their supply lines and communications.

The Coalition armies were unmoved. Realising the weakness of Napoleon’s army and the absence of significant opposition in Paris — as well as receiving an intercepted report detailing the lack of weapons and powder in the capital alongside growing discontent among the people — Schwarzenberg and Blücher swung west to seize the city. As Mortier and Marmont, left to watch Blücher on the Marne, moved to rejoin the Emperor, they were surprised by Schwarzenberg’s Army of Bohemia, which had moved directly into their path. The two Marshals lost 10,000 men and nearly 80 guns.

Now aware of the danger and Schwarzenberg’s disinterest in his own lines of communication, Napoleon desperately tried to force-march back to his capital. While Mortier and Marmont had managed to return to Paris before the allies could besiege it, Napoleon was too late. On 30 March the attacks began as 140,000 Coalition troops, including countless veterans, marched against Paris’s garrison of fewer than 40,000, many of whom were National Guardsmen and volunteers. Although they fought hard to defend the city, inflicting more than 10,000 losses on the allies, it was a foregone conclusion. The Governor of the Hôtel des Invalides, Marshal Sérurier, ordered the burning of 1,400 Coalition standards, as well as Frederick the Great’s sword and sash, to avoid their recapture.

Plans by Napoleon for the recapture of the city with his last 35,000 men were rejected by his Marshals. After what was, for some, more than 20 years of war, they were exhausted and did not want to see Paris burn as Moscow had. Napoleon reacted with indignation and anger, accusing them of treachery and refusing to bow out in favour of his young son. However, on 4 April, news that Marshal Marmont had surrendered his 20,000-strong Corps outside Paris without a fight was the nail in the coffin, and Napoleon agreed to abdicate at the Fontainebleau Palace.

1814 is often forgotten when people look back on Napoleon’s military achievements, set aside in favour of the glories of Austerlitz or Marengo. However, it is arguably when he was at his very best. Pushed to the brink and fighting for his very survival, the man who had looked beaten and exhausted at Leipzig just months before was reinvigorated into the ‘God of War’ that Clausewitz described him as. Wellington himself said that ‘The study of it has given me a greater idea of his genius than any other’. With Napoleon’s spring 1814 campaign still studied in institutions such as West Point, it deserves a place in the annals of military history as a strategic masterpiece.